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ABSTRACT
/
This paper departs from the usual subject of the Space Simulation Conference
and concerns itself with the need for testing under simulated mission oper-
ational conditions and reviews the results of such tests from the point of
view of the user. It presents a brief overview of the usual test sequences
for high reliability, long life spacecraft and will analyze the effectiveness
of the testing program in terms of the defects which are discovered by such
tests. The need for automation, innovative mechanical test procedures and
design for testability will be discussed.
INTRODUCTION
As our spacecraft have becomeprogressively more complex and their
missions have becomemore sophisticated and of longer duration, it has be-
come increasingly important to improve the methods for verifying design and
workmanship prior to making the decision to launch. Such verification is
based on an extensive testing program which duplicates operation over a range
of worst case mission scenarios and simulates exposure to launch, boost and
space flight environments.
Since a typical spacecraft may cost $40 million, contain 60,000
electronic piece parts and must last 7 to 10 years in orbit, it clearly is
wise to learn as much as possible about how well it can be expected to per-
form in space. A comprehensive test program must progress in a logical
manner from development testing, through qualification and acceptance
testing to flight readiness checkout at the launch site. In addition, the
test program must include development, qualification and dcceptance tests at
progressively higher levels of assembly starting with parts and continuing
th,'ough unit level (i.e., component, black box or assembly) to subsystem,
spacecraft and system level tests. The real challenge lies in choosing the
most perceptive and cost effective test procedures and environmental exposures
at each assembly level. These must be tailored to the specific spacecraft
and missiona_ hand but can be summarizedfor purposesof this paperas
describedbelow.
PARTSTESTING
Currentproceduresfor piece-parttestingare basedon a largebody
of engineering'datand variousanalysesof the physicsof failurefor
the differentkindsof parts. Standardizationof test procedureshas been
fosteredby the governmentand the electronicparts industry. For example,
MIL-STD-883definesscreeningtestsfor micro-electronicdevicesand is
intendedto yield an in-equipmentfailurerateof less than .004%per
thousandhours for high reliability(ClassS) parts. Detailedscreening,
samplingand lot qualificationtestsare specified,includingtemperature
cycling,burn-in,particleimpactnoisedetection(PIND),radiographic
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Linspectionand lifetests,amongothers. Comparablespecificationsand
procurementstandardsexist for other electronicpartsand are reflected
in the designmanualsand proceduresused by individualaerospacecontractors.
These procedureshave resultedin a significantdrop in part failuresduring
subsequentunit leveltesting.
COMPONENTTESTS
Unitor component-leveltest proceduresare designedto verifyall
functionalperformancerequirementsover a rangeof environmentalexposures
withoutdisassemblyor changein the configurationof the componentas
installedin the spacecraft. For electroniccomponentsthisusually
requiresthat test pointsbe broughtout to a specialtestconnector;this
makes it possibleto injecttestsignalsand observethe resulting
responoe,waveforms,logic levels,etc. Computercontrolledspecialtest
equipmentis requiredfor functionalcheckoutof digitalcomponentsand
complicatedelectroniccomponentswhich haveseveralmodesof operation
and processa varietyof signals. Mechanicaland electromechanical
compoHentsalso requirespecialpurposetestequipmentand test fixtures
for functionalcheckoutbut generallydo not requireautomatedtesting.
The environmentaltestsfor component-levelqualificationand acceptance
are specifiedin MIL-STD-1540A"TestRequirementsfor Space Vehicles". The
newerspacecraftprojects,especiallythosefor importantmilitarymissions,
use the approachspelledout by thisdocument. It involvesfunctionaltesting
before,duringand after exposureto pyroshock,randomvibrationor acoustics,
thermalcycling,vacuumand EMI. Dependingon the natureof the component,
thermalcyclingis performedat ambientpressureor in a vacuumchamber. In
eithercaseat leasteight temperaturecyclesshouldbe appliedto expose
any workmanshipor designdefectsbeforeacceptance.Test levelsand duration
vary fromunit to unit but shouldbe selectedto acceleratedetectionof
inherentdefectswithoutinducingdamageor degradationof goodequipment.
SPACECRAFTTESTS
A simplifiedversionof a typicalspacecraft-leveltestflow is shown
in Figure1. Thereare threeseparatephases,namelyan integrationphase,
an environmentalqualificationor acceptancephaseand a prelaunchverifi-
cationphase. Duringthe integrationphasethe variouscomponents,
subassembliesand harnesseswhich have undergonetestingat the componentand
part levelare installedon the spacecraftstructureand interconnectedto
formsubsystemsand relatedequipmentgroups. Physicalinspectionand
functionaltestsare performedunder ambientconditionsto verifyinterfaces
and correctnessof the assemblyprocedures.The environmentalqualification
or acceptancephaseconsistsof functionalperformancetestsunder various
environmentalconditionsto demonstratethat the full rangeof performance
requirementsis met. The usual approachis to conductend-to-endtests
which closelysimulatethe actualin-orbitmission. Largedeployable
appendagessuchas solararraysand antennasare usuallytestedseparately
and may be removedduringvariouselectricalfunctionaltests. The prelaunch
verificationtestsare performedat the launchsiteand varyoreatlyfrom
programto program. On some spacecrafta fullfunctionaltest is performed
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priorto installingthe spacecrafton the booster. In other casesonly
on-standinterfaceand Cn_landcompatibilitytestsare conductedin addition
to ordnancecircuitcheckoutand fuelingoperations.
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EVALUATIONOF TEST RESULTS
The ultimateobjectiveis to launchspacecraftwhichwill operate
flawlesslyin orbitfor theirspecifiedlifetimeor longer. We therefore
strivefor failure-freeacceptancetestingunderconditionswhich closely
simulateorbitalconditions. Discrepancieswhichare discoveredduring
acceptancetestingare correctedpriorto launch. In Figures2 and 3 we
haveattemptedto correlateorbitalperformanceto performanceduring
acceptancetestingpriorto launch. The averagenumberof on-orbitand
acceptancetest discrepanciesfor fourdifferentprojectsrepresentinga
totalof 25 spacecraftwas normalizedwith respectto spacecraftcomplexity
as measuredin termsof part countand the averagenumberof defectsper
1000partswas plottedfor each project. Notethat lowerdefectrates
duringacceptancetestingyield betterun-orbitperformance.This is
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also borne oJt by Figure 3 which plots normalized on-orbit discrepancies
against spacecraft level acceptance test discrepancies fo 12 individual ,
spacecraft comprising three separate projects.
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Figure 2 - Orbital Performance Correlation by Project
ANALYSIS OF TEST PROGRAM
In order to determine whether the current approach of duplicating antici-
pated operating modes and simulating space environments during the qualifica-
tion and acceptance test program is really effective in locating all potential
defects, we reviewed the actual test history for two recent spacecraft projects
in more detail. Tables iar 2 give the number and type of discrepai.:ies
which were found during successive phases of the testing program and during
orbital operation. Project A consists of a qualification test spacecraft and
three identical flight spacecraft all of which are currently operating in
orbit. Each satellite contaiblsapproximately 58,000 electronic parts
including &bout 5500 ,ntegratedcircuits. Project B consists of three
scientific satellites, all of which have been launched. The first of the
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threespacecraftservedas botha prototypeand flightvehiclesince there
w_s no separatequal spacecraft.Not includingthe scientificpayload,each
satellitecontainsapproximately30,000electronicparts. The data of Table 2
does not includediscrepanciesfound in the scientificinstrumentspayloads
sincethesewere GFE.
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Figure3 - OrbitalPerformancevs. SystemTest Results
BothTablesi and 2 providethe numberof testdiscrepanciesdue to
defectsin the equipmentundertest, due to defectsin test proceduresand
due to causeswhich are not relatedto any defect. Note that367 and 174
productdefectsrespectivelywere foundduringcomponentlevelqualification
and acceptancetestingwhichwere correctedprior to startof spacecraftlevel
testing. Additionalcomponentdefectswere foundduringspacecraftlevel
testingin the factoryand at the launchsite and duringon-orbitoperation.
Theseadditionaldiscrepanciesare called"escapes"becausetheyescaped
detectionduringcomponentqualor acceptancetesting. The escaperatioEc
is simplythe ratioof componenttest escapesto tota_componentdefects.
Similarly,the on-orbitdiscrepanciesor performanceanomaliesare escapes
fromthe groundtestprogramif it is assumedthat thereare no spontaneous
failuresdue to wearoutor other causesduringthe missionlifeof the space-
craft. The escaperatioEo then is the ratioof on-orbitdiscrepanciesto
totaldiscrepancies.The purposeof theseratiosand the data of TablesI
and 2 is to providea broadoverviewof what resultscan be expectedfrom
. typicaltestingprograms.
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Table 1. PROJECTA - CAUSEOF TEST DISCREPANCIES
. , ' TEST LEVEL ..... (SCAP[ RATi'_ "
DEFECT/CAUSEOF OISCREPANCY ...COHPON[NT SPACECRAFT LAUNCH BASE ON"ORBIT Ec [c
PRODUCT DEFECTS
PART FAILURE 68 lO I 13.9
C_IPONENTF_NUFACTURING IT2 IQ 1 14.5 0.7
COFIPONENTDESIGN 174 28 |3.B
SPACECRAFTASSEF_LY 14
SPACECI_FTDESIGN ]6 [ 3 15
TEST INDUCED ]3 5
UNDETERMINED [!
TOTAL 367 103 2 4 14.3% 0.84%
PROCEDUREDEFECTS
DOCUMENTATION 110 34
TESTEQUIPNENT 4] 23 ]
OPERATORERROR 35. 16 |
TEST SETUP |B 3 !
TOTAL 204 16 3
NON-DEFECTS
_ITHIN TOLERANCE/WAIVER 78 ?I 2 4
UNABLE TO REPEAT PROBLEM 29 ]3 1
TOTAL 107 34 2 6
NOTES: 4 spacecraft,3 in orbit, 3 years of orbital performance
To gain furtherinsightintothe effectivenessof environmentalsimulation
for spacecraftleveltestingwe have brokendown the productdefectdiscre-
panciesas shown in Tables3 and 4 for ProjectsA and B respectively.Note
that in bothprojectsabout40% of the spacecraftacceptancetestdefects
were foundduringthe integrationphase (Figure1). ProjectA spacecraft
receiveda temperaturecyclingtest in a thermalchamberat ambientpressure
duringwhich 15 discrepancieswere observed. Duringthe subsequentT/V test
fourcomponentfailuresoccurred,all on the qualificationspacecraft.These
failuresmost likelywerenot inducedby the vacuumenvlr_nmentsinceeach of
the failedcomponentshad previouslypasseda T/V test as partof the compo-
nentacceptancesequence. Alsonote thaton ProjectB only one component
discrepancywas foundduringspacecraftT/V whos_discoverycannotbe credited
to vacuumexposure. It appearsthereforethatexposureto vacuumas part of
spacecraftlevelacceptancetestingis not as profitableas testingover the
widestpossibletemperaturerangein a thermalchamber. The merit of temper-
aturecyclingat the spacecraftlevelhas alsobeen demonstratedon a classi-
fiedprojectas describedin ReferenceI.
Carefulanalysisof the discrepancydata for ProjectsA and B and several
otherprojectsleadsto the followingadditionalconclusions:
a) A majorityof on-orbitdiscrepanciesa_e due to subtledesign
defec1:swhichwere not or couldnot be discoveredduringthe
qualificationand acceptancetest program.
b) Repetitiveroomambienttestingover a varietyof missionscenarios
and usingdifferenttestmethodswill disclosemore defectsthan
simpleenvironmentc_1exposurewithoutelectricalstress.
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Althoughit is impossibleto achievereliableoperationin orbitby testing
alone,it seemsaxiomaticthat the more testingand themore variationin
testingwhich is conducted,the betterthe orbitalperformance.This
justifiesthe use of automatedtestequipmentand requiresdesignof space-
craftfor testabilityas describedbelow.
Table 2. PROJECTB - C_USEOF TEST DISCREPANCIES
I
T_ST EV{L ESCA#E RATIQ
DEFECT/CAUSEOF DISCREPANCY CO_IPONENTL SPACECRAFT ' LAUNCIIBASE ] ON 'ORBIT E{ Eo
PRODUCTDEFECTS
F_RT FAILURE 38 4 1 13.6 2.3
COMPONENTMANUFACTURING 79 5 1 - 17.0 -
COMPONENTDESIGN 45 19 4 5 38.3 6.8
SPACECRAFTASSE_IBLY IB -
SPACECRAFTDESIGN II 2 I
TEST INDUCED 6 - 2
UNDETERNINED 6 4 ]
TOTAL 174 G1 11 7 _9,B 2.9%
PROCEDUREDEFFCTS
DOCUMENTATION 55 23 I
TEST EQUIPNENT 62 4 I
OPERATORERROR 50 13
TEST SETUP 35 ,T 3
TOTAL 202 47 5
NON-DEFECTS
WITHIN TOLERANCE/WAIVER 2] 21 2
UNABLE TO REPEAt PROBLEM 35 7 I I
TOTAL 56 28 3 I
NOTES: _ spacecraft,3 on orbit, 4 year_ of orbital performance
ExperimentTDRs not included
AUTOMATEDTESTING
An objectiveof the spacecraftacceptancetest sequenceis to exercise
all equipmentand verifyall the operatingmodes whlch the spacecraftwill
encounterduringits spacemission. To get an ideaof the complexityof such
a comprehensivespacecrafttest (CST)considerthe Trackingand Data Relay
Satellite(TDRS)shownin Figure4, which is currentlyunderdevelopmentat
TRW. The TDRS systemprovidestwo-waycommunicationswith a large ground
stationfor up to 20 spacecraftusers in low earth orbitsincludingthe
shuttleorbiter. In additlon,it providestwelve18 MHz repeaterchannels
at C band for commercialcommunicationsatelliteservice. Altogether,there
aremore than60 switchableRF communicationslinks. EachTDRS contains172
activeelectronicunitswhich containapproximately55,000parts of which
4500 are integratedcircuits. One thousandseventy-sixdiscreteand 58 serial
groundcommandsare availablefor configurationcontrol,redundancyswitching
and powermanagementduringon-orbitoperation. One thousandtwo hundred
eighty-eightperformanceand statusparametersare telemeteredto the ground.
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Table 3. PROJECTA - LOCATIONOF TEST DISCREPANCIES
ELECTRON_ICOMPONENTS PROPULSION(STRUCTURE HARNESS
!Workman- Nork_lan- Workman- TOTAL
lEST/DEFECT Part I, ship Design Part ship Design ship Design DEFECTS
UNIT ACCEPTANCE 68 100 167 12 7 354
SPACECRAFT
ACCEPTANCE "11 15 25 2 23 2 7 2, 87
Integration (3) (6) (12) (I) (11) (I) (3) (I) (38)
First Functional (3) (2) (5) (I0)
Temperature (2) (21 (7) (l) (2) (I) (15)
E_/IV, (1) (I) (I) (4} (I) (3)
Dynamics
Post Dynamics (4) (I) (S)
T/V Test (2) (2) (4)
Preship (2) (3) (I) (6)
Functional
Launch Base (1) (1)
w IJl
ON ORBIT ] I 2 4
Table4. PROJECTB - LOCATIONOF TEST DISCREPANCIES
ELECTRONICCO_IPONENTS PROPULSIUN/STRUCTURE HARNESS
Workman- Worknk_n- Workman- TOTAL
TEST/DEFECT Part ship Design Part ship Design ship DesignDEFECTS
UNIT ACCEPTANCE 35 79 43 3 2 162
SPACECRAFT 5 6 23 7 ] 11 12 65
ACCEP[ANCE
Integration (9) (5) (I) (2) (9) (26)
EMC (2) (I) (I) (I) (S)
First Functional (I) (2) (4) (I) (3) (11)
Dynamic (I) (I) (I) (I) (4)
Environment
Post Dynamic (1) (2) (2) (5)
Functional
T/V Environment (1) (1)
PreshipFunctional (i) (I) (1) (2) (5)
ETR (I) (I) (4) (Z) (8)
roll m l "....
ON ORBIT l 5 I 7
2O
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Figure 4. TDRSSpacecraft Configuration
Becauseof this complexity,a computeris requiredfor generatingcommand
sequences,processingof telemetrydata, conversionof RF measurementsto
performanceparametersappearingin requirementsspecificationsand for
recordingtest results. In addition,a computeris neededto controlthe test
equipmentwhich suppliesthe RF signals,sensorstimuliand electricalpower
which are requiredfor operationof the spacecraft.
The significanceof computerbased automatedtestingmust be recognized
by programmanagersand test facilitymanagers. Althoughcomputerswith
sufficientspeedand memorycapacityto handlealmostany spacecraftsystem
testrequirementare readilyavailable,the softwareneededfor conducting
the testand processingthe datamust be designedfor the specificspacecraft
and costssignificantlymore than the computerhardware. Standardizedsoftware
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and distributed processors are being used wherever possible to reduce this
high cost, but a lot more effort and innovation is required to arrive at
optimized automated test systems.
TESTABILITY
Another issue which is of major concern to system test organizations is
the basic testability of complex spacecraft. Over the last 10 to 15 years we
have seen a change in the characteristicsof spacecraft so that today we have
more and more digital equipment using LSI and on-board processing and much
larger and more complicated mechanical structures. In addition, the cross-
strapping and reconfigurationcapability of the electronic equipment is so
great that it is very difficult to validate all anticipated operating modes
prior to flight. It is, therefore, very important for test people to partici-
pate in the design of a spacecraft from the start in order to influence the
following design features:
• selection of test points and location of test connectors
• equipment layout and clearances to enable replacement of
faulty units
• provision of accelerated cc:._andcapability for automated
testing
• selection of telemetry measurements
• design of on-board computers for reprogrammabilityand
interfacingwith ground test equipment
• accessability for x-ray and visual inspection of
critical connectors
• mechanical design which enables functional testing of mechanisms
• location of hard points to allow safe support during testing
and transportation
• use of test-only sensors vs. flight telemetry
Several of these points may appear trivial or obvious, but experience has
shown that their importance must not be underestimated. Another observation
which should influence future activities is the fact that through automation
and improved test equipment we have kept pace with the increasing complexity
of electronic and electrical equipment aboard a spacecraft. On the other
hand, our mechanical and structural test procedures have not changed signifi-
cantly during the last 10 years. Acoustic and vibration test facilities are
available but methods for conducting deployment tests under simulated zero
gravity conditions are still relatively crude. On-orbit testing using the
shuttle as a base may prove to be a viable option in the future and deserves
further study.
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aCONCLUSIONSAND RECOI_ENDATIONS
Performanceduringacceptancetestingaffectsperformancein orbit.
Comprehensivetestingover a wide rangeof usageand environmentalconditions
has beena major contributorto the excellentsuccessrecordof spacecraft
which havebeen launched.
Severethermalthermalcyclingover the maximumallowabletemperature
rangeratherthanextendedthermalvacuumexposureshouldbe used to detect
workmanshipand designdefectsat the spacecraftlevel.
Test engineersand projectmanagersmust be awareof the large costand
schedulerequirementsfor generatingthe softwarewhich controlsthe automated
test procedures.
Methodsfor testingthe deploymentof appendagesand/orverifying
mechanicalcharacteristicsof large structureswill have to be improvedas
structuresbecomelargerand more flexibleand dynamicinteractionswhich
influencealignmentand pointingaccuraciesbecomemore critical.
Test engineersmust participatein early spacecraftdesigndecisionsand
exertgreaterinfluenceto insurethattestabilityis achieved.
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